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SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOL
CURRICULUM: CAN PARENTS OPT THEIR CHILDREN
OUT OF CURRICULAR DISCUSSIONS ABOUT SEXUAL
ORIENTATION AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE?
Kevin Rogers & Richard Fossey *

I.

INTRODUCTION

The right of the parent over the child is prior to the right of
the State.
Hillaire Belloc 1

Several states, primarily in the Northeast, have approved
same-sex marriage either by legislative action or judicial
decree,2 while thirty states have amended their constitutions to
prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriage. 3 In those states
where same-sex marriage has been approved, we can expect
* Kevin Rogers is Assistant Superintendent of Secondary Instruction for the Lewisville
Independent School District in Lewisville, Texas. Richard Fossey is the Mike Moses
Endowed Chair in Educational Administration at the University of North Texas.
1. HILLAIRE BELLO(\ ESSAYS OF A CATHOLIC 177 (1931).
2. See, e.g, Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Puh. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008)
(statutory ban on same-sex marriage violates equal protection provisions of the state
constitution); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (statutory ban on samesex marriage violates equal protection clause of Iowa Constitution); Goodridge v. Dept.
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (statutory prohibition against marriage of
same-sex couples fails rational basis scrutiny under Massachusetts Constitution). See
also, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 457: 1-a (2010) (recognizing same-sex marriage).
3. Paul Benjamin Linton, Same Sex Marriage and the New Mexico Equal Rights
Amendment, 20 GEO MASON U. CIV. R. L.J. 209, 209 n.l (201 0) (lists the following state
constitutional provisions that prohibit same-sex marriage: ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03;
ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. CONST. art. XXX,§ 1; ARK. CONST. amend. 83; CAL.
CONST. art. I,§ 7.5; COLO. CONST. art. II,§ :H; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 27; GA. CONST. art.
I, § IV; HAW. CONS'!'. art. I, § 23; IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28; KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16;
KY. CONST. § 233a; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25; MISS. CONST.
art. 14, § 26i3A; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 3i1; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7; NEB. CONST. art.
1, § 29; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 21; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28; OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11;
OKLA. CONST. art. 11, § i15; OR. CONST. art. XV, § 51; S.C. CONST. art. XVII, § 15; S.D.
CONST. art. XXI, § 9; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18; TEX. CONST. art. I,§ 32; UTAH CONST.
art. I, § 29; VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A; WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § liJ).
423
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same-sex marriage and sexual orientation to become part of the
public school curriculum-at least any aspects of the school
curriculum that deal with sexuality. 4
As same-sex marriage becomes more and more widespread,
conflict is inevitable between schools that seek to present
same-sex marriage as a legal and morally acceptable
alternative to traditional marriage and families who object to
same-sex marriage on religious or moral grounds. 5 For
example, the Roman Catholic Church, 6 the Southern Baptist
Church, 7 the United Methodist Church,g and The Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints 9 all disapprove of
homosexuality as a matter of religious doctrine; together these
four groups have almost one hundred million adherents in the
United States. 10
This paper does not consider the development of same-sex
marriage in the United States in any detail, and the paper
expresses no opinion about the wisdom of same-sex marriage
from a public policy perspective. Rather, the premise of this
paper is that conflict in the public schools over sexual

4. See LEARNING AI30U'I' SEXUAL DIVEI{SITY AT SCHOOL: WHAT IS AGE
APPROPRIATE? SAFE SCHOOLS COALITION, http://SafeSchoolsCoalition.org/whatisage
appropriate.pdf (last updated July 2009) (suggesting that primary school children
should be instructed about sexual orientation, including homosexuality and
bisexuality).
5. See, e.g., Parker v. Hurley, 511 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008) (parents sought to
shield their children from positive portrayals of same-sex marriage at their children's
elementary schools).
6. CATECHSIM OF THE CATHOLIC CHUHCH ~ 2357 (1994) (stating that homosexual
acts are contrary to natural law and can be approved under no circumstances).
7. Position Statement on Sexuality, OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE SOUTH J•:RN
BAPTIST CONVENTION, http://www.sbc.net/aboutus/pssexuality.asp (last visited May 2,
2011) (homosexuality is not a "valid alternative lifestyle").
8. UNITED METHODIST CHURCH BOOK OF DISCIPLINE
65 G (20{H)
("[T]he practice of homosexuality is incompatible with Christian teaching.").
9. Elder Dallin H. Oaks, Same-Gender Attraction, ENsrr;N, .July 1995, at 7, 7,
available at http://lds.org/ensign/199fill 0/same-gendE,r-attraction ?lang=eng ("Every
Latter-day Saint knows that God has forbidden all sexual relations outside the bonds of
marriage.").
10. See PIO:W FOHUM ON RELIGION & PU13LIC LIFE, RELIG!OUS BELIEFS UNDERPIN
OPPOSITION TO HOMOSEXUALITY 6 (2003) (finding that 61'% of "committed white
Catholics" and 88% of "committed white evangelicals" consider homosexuality to be
sinful, and that 71% of black Protestants considered homosexuality to be a sin). A 2010
report by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that support for gay
marriage among white Catholics had grown in recent years, while white evangelical
Protestants continue to oppose same-sex marriage overwhelmingly. PEW FORUM ON
RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, RELIGIOUS BELIEFS UNDERPIN OPPOSITION TO
HOMOSEXUALITY 5-6 (2010).
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orientation is inevitable in those jurisdictions in which samesex marriage is approved. In states where same-sex marriage
has been adopted, either by statute or judicial decree, school
systems will undoubtedly begin portraying same-sex marriage
in a positive light, bringing school curricular decisions into
conflict with families whose religious beliefs condemn
homosexuality and same-sex marriage. To avoid this conflict,
clear statutory provisions should be adopted to allow parents to
shield their children from instruction regarding sexual
orientation, just as statutes already exist that permit parents
to opt their children out of instruction on sex education.
Currently, forty-four states allow parents to exempt their
children from instruction on sexual topics, either by statute or
administrative regulation. II The language and scope of these
statutes and regulations vary considerably from state to state,
but the fact that so many states give parents some legal right
to shield their children from sexual topics in the public schools
is an indication that state legislatures recognize parents'
sensitivity about the manner in which sexual topics are
presented to their children. This paper will examine
curriculum opt-out provisions that currently exist and suggest
a model statute that will allow parents to opt their children out
of any curricular activity that discusses sexual orientation.I 2

11.

DO PARENTS HAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SHIELD
THEIR CHILDREN FROM EXPOSURE TO SEXUAL TOPICS IN A
PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM? THE SHORT ANSWER IS "No"

In the venerable cases of Meyer u. Nebraska 13 and Pierce u.
Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, I4 the
Supreme Court articulated and affirmed the constitutional
right of parents to direct the education of their children. In
both cases, the Court identified this constitutional right as a

11. Tommy Kevin Rogers, Parental I{ights: Curriculum Opt-Outs in Public
Schools (Aug. 2010) (unpublished dissertation, University of North Texas) (on flle in
the university library at the University of North Texas, Denton, Texas).
12. See also Marc D. Stern, Liberty u Equality: /~quality u. Liberty, 5 NW .•J.L. &
Soc. PoL'Y ~l07 (2010) (proposing model statute in same-sex marriage states to protect
rdigious liberties of persons opposing same-sex marriage).
I :l. 262 U.S. :l90 (192:1).
11. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
In Meyer v. Nebraska, decided in 1923, Robert Meyer, a
teacher at a Lutheran parochial school, taught the German
language to a ten-year-old child at the school in violation of a
Nebraska statute that criminalized the teaching of a foreign
language to any child who had not completed the eighth grade.
Meyer was convicted of this offense and fined $25. 15 Although
the Nebraska Supreme Court upheld Meyer's conviction, the
U.S. Supreme Court struck down the statute at issue, finding
that Meyer had a constitutional right to teach the German
language and that parents had a corresponding constitutional
right-lodged in the Fourteenth Amendment-"to engage
[Meyer] ... to instruct their children." 16 No emergency had
arisen, the Court noted, that would justify this restriction on
teaching the German language. Therefore, the statute was
"arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within
the competency of the state." 17
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary, 18 the Supreme Court examined the
Oregon Compulsory Education Act, adopted in 1922 by a
voters' initiative that required all children ages eight to sixteen
to attend a public school until they had completed the eighth
grade. Parents who violated this law were guilty of a
misdemeanor. The Ku Klux Klan and the Scottish Rite Masons
had been primary supporters of the law, "whose members
believed in the superiority of white Protestants and the
inferiority of blacks, Jews, Catholics, and immigrants," and
who had come to the conclusion that closing parochial schools
and forcing all children into public schools "would fortify
American democracy." 19 The Society of Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary, a religious order operating a
parochial school in Oregon, and Hill Military Academy, a
nonsectarian private school, challenged the statute in federal

15. Meyer v. State, 187 N.W. 100 (Ncb. 1922), reu'd, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
:i90 (192:3).
16. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. at 400.
17. !d. at 10:1.
18. 2G8 U.S. fi 10 (1925).
19. ,Joseph Vitcritti, 13laine's Wake: School Choice, The First Amendment, and
State Constitutional Law, H ARVAIW J .L. & I'UH. l'OL'Y (1998).
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court, and they obtained an injunction barring enforcement of
the law. The State of Oregon then appealed.
Adopting the reasoning of its earlier decision in Meyer, the
Supreme Court struck down the Oregon law. Under the
doctrine of Meyer u. Nebraska, the Court declared, "we think it
entirely plain that the Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with
the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing
and education of children under their control." 20 As the Court
explained, parents have a constitutionally guaranteed liberty
interest in directing the education of their children, which
cannot be infringed upon by arbitrary and unreasonable
governmental action that is outside the competency of the
state. 21 In short, "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon
which all governments in this union repose excludes any
general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing
them to accept instruction from public teachers only." 22
Together, Meyer and Pierce established that parents have a
constitutional right to direct the education of their children.
Pierce made clear that parents have a constitutional right to
send their children to private schools and that the state may
not abolish private schools or force all children to enter the
public school system. 23
In the years since Meyer and Pierce, parents have brought
suit repeatedly, seeking to extend the holdings of those two
landmark decisions to include some parental voice in the dayto-day operations of the public schools. In essence, parents in
these suits have argued that their constitutional right to direct
the upbringing of their children included some authority to
control the content of the public school curriculum.
In seven federal appellate court decisions, parents have
argued that their constitutional right to direct the education of
their children, first articulated in Meyer and Pierce, entitled
them to shield their children from exposure to instruction or
materials that were objectionable to the parents on religious or
moral grounds. Unfortunately for the parents who brought

20. l'icrce, 268 U.S. at 5:31-:l5.
21. ld.
22. /d. at 5:l1.
2:i. In another decision from the same era, the Supreme Court issued a corollary
ruling in action against the territorial government of Hawaii. Not only could
government not abolish private schools, it could not regulatP them so onerously as to
dfectively put them out of business. Farrington v. Tokushige, 27:l U.S. 281 (1927).
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these cases, the federal appellate
unsympathetic in all seven cases.
A.

courts

were

[2011
entirely

Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education

Mozert v. Hawkins County Board of Education 24 is the first
federal appellate court decision in a line of cases that have
rejected parents' attempts to veto a public school district's
curricular and instructional decisions. In that case, seven
families, all identifying themselves as "born again
Christians," 25 sought to shield their children from exposure to a
Tennessee school district's reading program, which utilized the
Holt, Rinehart and Winston basic reading series. Vicki Frost,
one of the plaintiffs in action, served as the plaintiffs' chief
witness, and she testified that the reading series presented
ideas that were objectionable to the plaintiffs on religious
grounds, including such themes as "secular humanism,"
"supernaturalism," "pacifism, and "false views of death." 26
At the trial court level, the parents made two constitutional
arguments. First, they argued that the school district's
curriculum interfered with their constitutional right to direct
the upbringing of their children as affirmed in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters. 27 Second, they maintained that the school district's
requirement that their children be subjected to the approved
reading curriculum interfered with their right to free exercise
of religion. 2 s The trial court found in the parents' favor and
enjoined the school district from imposing its reading
curriculum on the unwilling families. 29
At the appellate level, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
did not address the parents' arguments under Pierce, and
Pierce was not mentioned in the majority opmwn.
Nevertheless, the appellate court rejected plaintiffs' other
constitutional argument-that they had a free exercise right to
shield their children from parts of the curriculum that they
found objectionable on religious grounds. The court

21. 827 F.2d 1058 (fjth Cir. 1987).
25. !d. at 1061.
26. /d. at 1062.
27. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Pub. Schs., G17 F. Supp. 1191, 1197 (E.D. Tenn.
1986), reu'd sub nom. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (Gth Cir.
1987).
28. Sec id.
29. /d. at 1201.
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acknowledged that the school district could not force students
to affirm a belief in a particular idea, but the school certainly
had the authority to offer a reading program "designed to
acquaint students with a multitude of ideas and concepts." 30
The court went on to say that families who send their children
to public schools were expected to adopt an attitude of civil
tolerance. 31 Such an attitude "does not require a person to
accept any other religion as the equal of the one to which that
person adheres. It merely requires recognition that in a
pluralistic society we must 'live and let live."' 32

B.

Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc.

In Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 33 decided
in 1995, the First Circuit Court of Appeals ruled very much in
harmony with the Sixth Circuit's Mozert opinion. In Brown,
parents of students in the Chelmsford School District of
Massachusetts sued the district after their children were
exposed to an AIDS and sex education program presented by a
contractor named Suzi Landolphi and that allegedly resorted to
sexually explicit and ribald language. Specifically:
Plaintiffs allege that Landolphi gave sexually explicit
monologues and participated in sexually suggestive skits with
several minors chosen from the audience. Specifically, the
complaint alleges that Landolphi: 1) told the students that
they were going to have a "group sexual experience, with
audience participation"; 2) used profane, lewd, and lascivious
language to describe body parts and excretory functions; 3)
advocated and approved oral sex, masturbation, homosexual
sexual activity, and condom use during promiscuous
premarital sex; 4) simulated masturbation; 5) characterized
the loose pants worn by one minor as "erection wear"; 6)
referred to being in "deep sh-" after anal sex; 7) had a male
minor lick an oversized condom with her, after which she had
a female minor pull it over the male minor's entire head and
blow it up; 8) encouraged a male minor to display his "orgasm
face" with her for the camera; 9) informed a male minor that
he was not having enough orgasms; 10) closely inspected a
minor and told him he had a "nice butt"; and 11) made

:lO. 827 F.2d at 1069.

:n. Id.
32. !d.

:1:1. 68 F.:ld 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
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eighteen references to orgasms, six references to male
genitals, and eight references to female genitals. 34

At the time that the controversial AIDS program took place,
the Chelmsford School Committee had a specific policy in place
reqmrmg "positive subscription, with written parental
permission" before students could participate in any
instruction on the topic of "human sexuality." 35 In addition, a
Massachusetts statute gave students the right to opt out of
"instruction on disease" if the instruction conflicted with the
student's "sincerely held religious beliefs." 36 According to the
plaintiff parents, the school district had violated state law and
its own policy when it exposed their children to the
controversial AIDS program without giving them advance
notice of the program's content and the opportunity to have
their children excused from attending. 37
A federal trial court dismissed the parents' complaint, and
the First Circuit affirmed the trial court's decisionY~ In spite of
the fact that the school district had arguably violated state law
and its own policy by exposing children to the AIDS program
without obtaining parents' permission, the First Circuit
refused to recognize any right of redress based on those
apparent violations. 39
In addition, the appellate court emphatically rejected the
parents' claim that the school had infringed upon their
constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children,
concluding that the Supreme Court's holdings in Meyer and
Pierce did not give parents the right to control what public
schools taught their children:
The Meyer and Pierce cases, we think, evince the principle
that the state cannot prevent parents from choosing a specific
educational program-whether it be religious instruction at a
private school or instruction in a foreign language. That is,
the state does not have the power to "standardize its children"
or "foster a homogenous people" by completely foreclosing the
opportunity of individuals and groups to choose a different
path of education. We do not think, however, that this

:l1. !d. at 529.
:l5. !d. at 5:l0.
:J6. !d. at 5.'35 (citing MASS.
:l7. /d. at 5:l0.
:l8. Id. at 5:lO, fi11.
:J9. See id. at 5:J9.

G~:N.

LAWS. ch. 71. § 1(1995)).
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freedom encompasses a fundamental constitutional right to
dictate the curriculum at the public school to which they have
chosen to send their children. . . . If all parents had a
fundamental constitutional right to dictate individually what
the schools teach their children, the schools would be forced to
cater a curriculum for each student whose parents had
genuine moral disagreements with the school's choice of
subject matter. We cannot see that the Constitution imposes
such a burden on state educational systems, and accordingly
find that the rights of parents as described by Meyer and
Pierce do not encompass a broad-based right to restrict the
flow of information in the public schools. 40

C.

Parents United for Better Schools v. School District of
Philadelphia

Brown u. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc. was
followed by five more federal appellate court decisions that
refused to extend the constitutional right of parents to direct
the upbringing of their children to include a right to prevents
schools from presenting their children with objectionable
materials about sex. In Parents United for Better Schools, Inc.
u. School District of Philadelphia Board of Education, 41 a group
of parents sued the Philadelphia school district seeking a
permanent injunction to prevent the district from distributing
condoms to students. In implementing the program, the school
board affirmed that abstinence from sexual activity during
adolescence "promotes good health and a healthy lifestyle."42
Nevertheless, the school board concluded that the distribution
of condoms to students was good public policy, partially as a
means of reducing the risk of teen pregnancy and the
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases. The school
district's condom-distribution policy specifically gave parents
the option of refusing to allow their children to participate,
stating that parents "have the absolute right to veto their
child's or children's participation in the program." 43
In seeking to enjoin the school district from implementing
its condom-distribution program, the parent group argued that
the program fell outside the school board's lawful authority and
,10.
11.
12.
1:J.

/d. at fi:J:l-:l1 (internal citations omitted).
118 F.:ld 260 (:lrd Cir. 1998).
/d. at 26:l.
/d. at 261.

432

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2011

violated parents' constitutional right "to be free from
unnecessary governmental intrusion in the rearing of their
children." 44 Even though the school district allowed parents to
bar their children from receiving condoms, the plaintiffs
maintained that the district had no legal authority to be in the
condom -distribution business. 45
Ruling on the school district's motion for summary
judgment, a federal trial court dismissed the parent group's
suit, and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The
Third Circuit ruled that the school district had the legal
authority to adopt its condom-distribution policy and that the
policy did not intrude on parents' constitutional right to direct
the upbringing of their children. 46 Although the Third Circuit
recognized ''the strong parental interest in deciding what is
proper for the preservation of their children's health," the court
did not believe the school district's policy intruded on that
right. 47 Participation in the program was voluntary, the court
pointed out; and the program specifically reserved to parents
the option of refusing to allow their children to participate. 4 x

D.

Leebaert v. Harrington

In Leebaert v. Harrington, 49 Turk Leebaert sued a
Connecticut school district, arguing that his constitutional
right to direct the upbringing and education of his son Corky
required the school district to excuse his son from all health
education classes, not just those that dealt with human
sexuality. Leebaert argued that this constitutional right
stemmed from Meyer and Pierce and was "fundamental,"
requiring the school district to show that it had a compelling
interest in pursuing its curriculum that overrode Leebaert's
constitutional interest. 50
Connecticut law authorized the State Board of Education to
develop a family-life curriculum guide for the public schools,
which would include such topics as family planning, human

11.
4G.
16.
17.
Hl.
19.
50.

!d. at 270.
!d.
!d. at 275.
/d.
/d.
:l:l2 F.:ld 1:l1 (2nd Cir. 200:l).
!d. at 1:l(J.
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sexuality, parenting, and various aspects of family life; but
Connecticut law further provided that no student could be
compelled to participate in a school district's family life
program. 51 School authorities had excused Corky Leebaert
from participating in six classes in the seventh-grade healtheducation curriculum that addressed human sexuality and
AIDS, but the district insisted that Corky attend the other
classes, including classes that discussed issues pertaining to
the use of tobacco, drugs, and alcohol. 52
Apparently, Leebaert insisted on shielding his son from the
entire health education class because he suspected the class
would expose his son to values that were objectionable to him
on religious grounds. 53 For example, he suspected some of the
instruction would contradict his traditional view of marriagethat a married man and woman is the basic unit of the
family. 54 According to Leebaert, "The school teaches that this
unit can be comprised of anything or anyone, that anything you
say can be a family. This contradicts my religious beliefs." 55
Relying heavily on the First Circuit's Brown decision, the
Second Circuit rejected Leebaert's argument that the school
could not require his son to attend health education classes
unless it could show that it had a compelling government
interest that overrode Leebaert's constitutional right to direct
the education of his son. 56 "Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny do
not begin to suggest the existence of a fundamental right of
every parent to tell a public school what his or her child will
and will not be taught," the First Circuit wrote. 57 Indeed, the
court observed:
[R]ecognition of such a fundamental right-requiring a public
school to establish that a course of instruction objected to by a
parent was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state
interest before the school could employ it with respect to the
parent's child-would make it difficult or impossible for any
public school authority to administer a school curriculum that
51. !d. at 1 :!5. Under Connecticut law, "no student shall be required hy any local
or regional board of t>ducation to participate in any such family life program which may
be offered within such public schools." CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-16e (2009).
52. Leebaert, ;);)2 F.:ld at 1:l7.
5:3. Sec id.
51. See id. at 1 :37-:ls.
55. !d. at 1 :Js.
56. /d.at111.
57. /d.

434

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2011

would respond to the overall educational needs of the
community and its children. 5 8

E.

Fields v. Palmdale School District

In Fields v. Palmdale School District, 59 decided in 2005,
parents sued a California school district after school authorities
administered a psychological assessment questionnaire to their
elementary-school-aged children that contained questions on
sexual topics. School officials gave parents advance notice that
the questionnaire would be distributed to their children, but
plaintiffs complained that they were not apprised that the
questionnaire contained questions of a sexual nature. 60
Questions with sexual references included: "Touching my
private parts too much," "Thinking about touching other
people's private parts," and "Thinking about sex." 61
As in Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., the
California parents claimed that the school district's action
interfered with their right to direct the upbringing of their
children in violation of constitutional principles laid down in
Meyer and Pierce. 62 A Ninth Circuit panel rejected this claim
outright. Citing Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc.
with approval, the Ninth Circuit ruled that parents have no
constitutional right "to restrict the public schools from
providing information on the subject of sex." 63
F.

C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education

In C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education, 64 another
controversy over a school-administered student survey, parents
sued a New Jersey school district after the district
administered a survey to students without obtaining their
parents' consent. This survey sought information about
students' alcohol and drug use, their sexual activity, their
suicide attempts, and their relationships with their parents. 65

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
G:l.

Jd.

127 F.:ld 1197 (9th Cir. 2005), aff'd as modified, 117 F.:ld 1187 (9th Cir. 2006).
!d. at 1202.
!d. at 1202 n.:l.
!d. at 1201.
Fields v. l'almdalt• Sch. Dist., 117 F.:ld 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2006).
61. 1:l0 F.:id !59 (:lrd Cir. 2005).
G5. /d. at Hil.
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The plaintiffs sued on a variety of grounds, alleging a violation
ofthe Family Educational Records Privacy Act, 66 the Protection
of Pupil Rights Amendment, 67 and also claiming that the
administration of the survey unconstitutionally forced students
to engage in forced speech and interfered with parents'
constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their children. 6 x
A federal trial court dismissed all claims, based partly on the
conclusion that the student participation in the survey was
voluntary. 69 The parents appealed.
Affirming the trial court, the Third Circuit ruled that the
parents had suffered no constitutional injury. The appellate
court ruled that the evidence supported the conclusion that
student participation in the survey was not voluntary and the
court noted that the New Jersey legislature had passed a lawapparently in response to the events that were the subject of
the litigation-requiring "prior written informed consent" from
parents before they could administer student surveys in the
public schools. 70
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded that the
administration of the student survey-even though student
participation may have been required-did not amount to a
constitutional violation. The court acknowledged "that
introducing a child to sensitive topics before a parent might
have done so herself can complicate and even undermine
parental authority." 71 The court concluded, however, that
administration of the survey did not amount to a constitutional
interference with parents' decision-making authority over their
children's upbringing. 72

G.

Parker v. Hurley

Finally, in Parker v. Hurley, 73 the First Circuit, reaffirming
the philosophy it had laid down in Brown v. Hot, Sexy and
Safer Productions, Inc., ruled that parents of elementary school
children had no constitutional right to bar a Massachusetts
66.
G7.
GH.
G9.
70.
71.
72.
7:3.

20 U.S.C. § 12:l2g (2010).
/d. § 12:l2h.

Ridgewood Bd. of /~due., 1:30 F.:ld at ltl6.
/d. at 1 75-7G.
/d. at 1H5 (citing N ..J. STAT. ANN.§ 181\::lG-:31 (2001)).
!d.
/d.
511 F.:ld tl7 (1st Cir. 200H).
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school district from exposing their children to reading
materials that portrayed same-sex marriage in a positive light.
Parker is particularly pertinent because the state of
Massachusetts had a statute in force at the time of the dispute
that required school districts to give parents notice and an
opportunity to exempt their children from those parts of the
school curriculum "which primarily involves human sexual
education or human sexuality issues." 74 The Massachusetts
Department of Education, however, had stated in an opinion
letter that the parental-notice statute did not apply to
"educational materials designed to promote tolerance,
including materials recogmzmg differences in sexual
orientation, if those materials are presented 'without further
instruction or discussion of the physical and sexual
implications of homosexuality."' 75
Plaintiffs in the case, David and Tonia Parker and Joseph
and Robin Wirthlin, were "devout Judea-Christians" whose
core religious beliefs included a belief "that homosexual
behavior and gay marriage are immoral and violated God's
law." 76 ln 2005, the Parkers complained to their son Jacob's
school principal after Jacob came home from school with a
picture book entitled Who's in a Family, which depicted samesex families in a positive light.7 7 The Parkers claimed the
school had an obligation under Massachusetts law not to allow
Jacob to see the book without giving his parents notice and an
opportunity to "opt out" of having Jacob exposed to it. Jacob's
principal rejected the Parker's position, based on his belief that
the Massachusetts opt-out statute didn't apply to Who's in a
Family.n
Joseph and Robin Wirthlin, the other plaintiffs in the suit,
complained to school authorities after a teacher read aloud
from the book King and King in their son Joseph's secondgrade class. 79 Like Who's in a Family?, King and a King
portrayed same-sex marriage in a positive light. xo The school
district rejected the Wirthlin's complaint, taking the position

71.
75.
76.
77.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § :l2A (West 2011).

Parker. 51!f F.2d at 92 n.2.
ld. at 92.
ld.
78. /d. at 91 n.1.
79. !d. at 9:3.
80. !d.
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that the Massachusetts opt-out law did not apply to a teacher's
reading, without further comment, from King and King to a
class of second graders. X1
In the litigation that followed, a federal trial court
dismissed the two families' claims, and the First Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the trial court on appeal. Ruling very much
in harmony with its 1995 decision in Brown, the First Circuit
stated, "Public schools are not obliged to shield individual
students from ideas which potentially are religiously offensive,
particularly when the school imposes no requirement that the
student agree with or affirm those ideas, or even participate in
discussions about them."iQ The court did not address the issue
of the plaintiffs' statutory right to exempt their children from
instruction on sex education or human sexuality. Instead, it
dismissed all state claims without prejudice and invited the
families to pursue those claims in state court.
Mozert, Brown, Parents United, Leebaert, Fields, Ridgewood
Board of Education, and Parker are not identical in their
reasoning. For example, although most of the decisions
considered the scope of a parents' constitutional right to direct
the upbringing of the parent's child as articulated in Pierce and
Mozert, Parents United did not rely on Pierce. Also, in the
Leebaert decision, the plaintiff went beyond arguing that he
had a right to shield his child from exposure to sexual topics.
Turk Leebaert maintained that he had a constitutional right to
shield his son from the entire health education course.
Nevertheless, these seven federal appellate decisions, when
taken together, lead to one incontrovertible conclusion: parents
have no constitutional right to exempt their children from
participating in school learning activities based on the parents'
religious or moral views. 83

81. /d.
82. /d. at 106.

8:1. nut see Emily J. Brown, Note, When Insiders IJecome Outsiders: Parental
Objections to Public School Sex Hducation Prowams, 59 DVKF: L..J. 109 (200~l) (arguing
that parents have a fundamental right to dired their children's moral and educational
upbringing that includes the right to exempt their children from objectionable sex
education programs in public schools).
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III. IN MOST STATES PARENTS HAVE A STATUTORY RIGHT TO
OPT OUT THEIR CHILDREN FROM SOME PARTS OF THE
CURRICULUM, MOST COMMONLY SEX EDUCATION

As the discussion in the previous section makes clear,
federal appellate courts have ruled that parents have virtually
no constitutional right to remove their children from any part
of the public school curriculum, even if the parents' objection is
based on religious or moral grounds. Nevertheless, although
federal courts do not allow curriculum opt-outs on
constitutional grounds, most states have statutes or
administrative regulations that grant curricular exemptions in
varying situations for public schools. As explained below, coauthor Kevin Rogers identified all statutes or administrative
regulations in all fifty states and the District of Columbia that
grant parents a specific right to excuse their children from
some part of the public school curriculum. These statutes and
regulations were then categorized into three groups: states
with opt-out laws that are "restrictive," states with opt-out
laws that are "permissive," and states that are categorized as
"non-existent" (meaning that these states have no curriculum
opt-out law).
An examination of curriculum opt-out statutes and
regulations shows that terminology varies widely. In many
statutes, terminology other than "opt-out" is used. For example,
terms such as exempt, excuse, allow to withdraw from, and
choose not to participate in are often used in curriculum opt-out
statutes. In some states, students can be excused from only the
specific part of the course that parents consider offensive under
these opt-out provisions. In other states, the opt-out provisions
allow students to miss the entire course if parents find it
objectionable.x 4 Another practice, which gives parents even
more authority when dealing with an offensive curriculum, is
known as "opt-in." In states where the opt-in applies, public
schools are only allowed to include students in particular
courses, such as sex education or comprehensive health, after a
parent is notified of the content and grants specific written
permission for their child to be enrolled in the course prior to
any instruction. xs

8!1. See, e.!{., 'l'r•:x. Euuc. Corn: ANN.§ 2G.010 (West 2009).
85. See, e.g., Corn. R~:v. STAT. § 22-25-101(6)(b) (2011) ("School officials shall
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In addition, although a core purpose of all these curriculum
opt-out statutes and regulations is to give parents the right to
excuse their children from at least some parts of instruction on
human sexuality, states define instruction on human sexuality
differently. Some states use the term "family life education" in
their opt-out provisions. Maine, for example, defines "family
life education" as education in K-12 regarding human
development and sexuality, including education on family
planning and medically accurate and age-appropriate
information about sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). X6
Virginia describes family life education to include family living
and community relationships, human reproduction and
sexuality, and the etiology, prevention, and effects of STDs.x 7
Other jurisdictions define instruction on human sexuality
as health education. For example, Delaware's K-12 health
education program includes addressing "tobacco, alcohol and
other drugs; injury prevention and safety; nutrition and
physical activity; family life and sexuality; personal health and
wellness; mental health; and community and environmental
health."xx The District of Columbia also uses the term "health
education," which includes the following content areas: tobacco,
alcohol and other drug education; CPR, first aid and safety;
injury and violence prevention; human sexuality and family;
nutrition and dietary patterns that contribute to disease;
prevention and control of disease; and consumer and
environmental health. X9
In many states, sex education prescribes how instruction on
human sexuality is to be presented. In Missouri, instruction on
human sexuality and STDs must be medically accurate; 90 and
instruction must present abstinence from sexual activity as the
preferred choice. 91 Missouri law also requires sex education
instruction to emphasize STDs as serious health hazards and
to stress the dangerous connection of sexual activity to human
rPceiv'~

prior written approval from a parent or guardian before his or her child may
participate in any program discussing or teaching sexuality and human
reproduction.'").
86. ME. REV. STAT. 22 § 1902 (1-A) (201 0).
87. VA. COllE ANN. § 22.1-207.1 (West 2011).
88. 11 DEL. ADMIN. COllE§ 851.1.1.:l (2010).
89. D.C. MUN. i{EUS., tit. 5, § 2:3.04 (2001), available at http://www.youthdPvclop
mPnt.org/ad/dc.htm.
90. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 170.015.1 (West 2010).
91. /d. § 170.()15.1(1).
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immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS). 92 In addition, Missouri requires sex
education instruction to include conversations about the
possible emotional and psychological consequences of
preadolescent and adolescent sexual activity and the
consequences of adolescent pregnancy93 as well instruction that
advises students of the laws pertaining to their financial
responsibility to children born in and out of wedlock. 94
Similarly, Arizona school districts with sex education
curricula are required to "include instruction on the laws
relating to sexual conduct with a minor for pupils in grades
seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, and twelve." 95 Arizona's sex
education curriculum is outlined in administrative regulations
and emphasizes abstinence from sexual intercourse, the
consequences of STDs, and the emotional and psychological
consequences of preadolescent and adolescent sexual
intercourse and pregnancy. Arizona also prescribes sex
education to include information pertaining to the financial
responsibilities of parenting and legal liabilities related to
sexual intercourse with a minor. 96
Many states include instruction about HIV/AIDS as part of
their sex education curriculum. New Mexico requires
HIV/AIDS instruction to at least include: (a) definition of HIV
and AIDS; (b) the symptoms and prognosis of HIV/AIDS; (c)
ways HIV/AIDS are spread; (d) ways to reduce the risks of
contracting HIV/AIDS, stressing abstinence; (e) societal
implications and resources for medical care. 97 Rhode Island law
defines the state's AIDS curricular requirements to include
giving accurate information on the transmission of AIDS with
an emphasis on prevention through sexual abstinence. 9H For a
complete list of the type of curriculum opt-outs allowed by each
state, see Table 1.

92. !d. § I 70.0151. I (2).
9:3. !d.§ 170.015.1(1).
9·1. I d. § 170.015.1 (6).
95. i\.mz. I{ IN. STAT. i\.NN. § 15-10-2.:3 (201 0).

96. i\.iUZ. i\.Dl'vll!'-1. Com:§ R7-2-:lO:l. :l(B) (2010).
97. N.M. COlli<: !{. § 6.12.2.1 O(C)(:J) (LexisNexis 20 I 0).
9H. IU. GEN. LAWS i\.NN. § H:i-22-17(1\.) (West 201 0).
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Classification of States Based on Opt-Out Statutes

Based on the review of statutes, administrative codes, and
education codes, each of the fifty states and the District of
Columbia can be classified into one of three categories of optout provisions: non-existent, restrictive, and permissive (see
Table 2). In this study, "non-existent," was defined to mean a
state with no statutory or regulatory curriculum exemption
provision. Restrictive states were defined as those states that
allow parents to opt out of no more than two areas of the school
curriculum. Permissive states were defined as states that allow
parents to opt out of at least three areas of the curriculum or
that require parents' advance permission before their children
could be exposed to some part of the curriculum.

Table 1
Opt-Out Statutes by Curricular Type and by State
If yes, type of opt-outs

STATE
Alabama

Opt-out
statutes
YES

Alaska

No

Arizona

YES

Arkansas

YES

California

YES

X

X

Colorado

YES

X

X

Connecticut

YES

X

X

X

Delaware

No

D.C.

YES

X

Florida

YES

X

X

X

Georgia

YES

X

X

X

Hawaii

No

Idaho

YES

X

Illinois

YES

X

X

X

Indiana

YES

X

X

Iowa

YES

X

s

H

X

X

A

p

D

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X
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STATE

Opt-out
statutes

s

Kansas

YES

X

X

Kentucky

No

Louisiana

YES

X

X

Maine

YES

X

X

X

Maryland

YES

X

X

X

Massachusetts

YES

X

Michigan

YES

X

X

Minnesota

YES

X

X

Mississippi

YES

X

Missouri

YES

X

X

Montana

YES

X

X

Nebraska

No

Nevada

YES

X

X

New Hampshire

YES

X

X

X

New Jersey

YES

X

X

X

New Mexico

YES

X

New York

YES

North Carolina

YES

North Dakota

No

Ohio I

YES

Oklahoma

YES

X

X

Oregon

YES

X

X

Pennsylvania

YES

Rhode Island

YES

X

X

South Carolina

YES

X

X

South Dakota

No

Tennessee

YES

X

X

X

Texas

YES

X

X

X

Utah

YES

X

H

A

p

D

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X

X
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STATE

Opt-out
statutes

Vermont

YES

Virginia

YES

X

X

Washington

YES

X

X

West Virginia

YES

Wisconsin

YES

Wyoming

YES

s

H

p

A

443

D

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

Note. 0hio permits thn:e other curriculum opt-outs in areas of venereal disPasc'.
1

Cl'l{, and grades K-G personal safety and assault prevention instruction.
S=sex or family life education. H=health l:ducation. A=HlV/AlDS instruction.
I'= I'. E. D=animal dissection.

Table 2
State Classifications by Number of Opt-out Statutes
Ogt-out No.
Opt-

1-

STATE

0

Ill

N
p

X
X

Arkansas

R

p

X

California
Colorado

X

X
X

Connecticut
X

p
p

N
X

D.C.

Status
R

X

Arizona

Delaware

>2

X

Alabama
Alaska

2

R

Florida

X

p

Georgia

X

p

Hawaii
Idaho

X

N
X
X

Illinois
Indiana

R

X

p
R
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STATE

0

12

>2

Optln

Status

Iowa

X

R

Kansas

X

R

Kentucky

N

X
X

Louisiana

R

Maine

X

Maryland

X

Massachusetts

X

Michigan

X

p

X

R

X

p
p

X

Minnesota

p

X

Missouri

X

R

Montana

X

R

Nebraska

X

p

Mississippi

X

N

X

Nevada

X

p

New
Hampshire

X

p

New Jersey

X

p

New Mexico

X

R

New York

X

R

North
Carolina

X

North Dakota

X

X

N
p

X

Ohio

X

Oklahoma
Oregon

R

p

X

Pennsylvania

p

R

X

Rhode Island

X

p

South
Carolina

X

p

South Dakota
Tennessee

X

N

X

X

p
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1-

STATE
Texas

0

2

>2

X

Vermont

X

Status

Ill

p

X

Utah

X

p
R

Virginia

X

p

Washington

X

p

West Virginia

X

Wisconsin
Wyoming

R
X

X

445

p
R

Note. N=Non-existent (state has no opt-out statute); R=Restrictive(state has 1 or 2
opt-out statutes,

(~.g.,

health education); I'=Permissive(state has more than 2 opt-out

stntutes or has opt-in ,.;tntute that requires prior parent permission for some curricula).

1. States with non-existent curriculum opt-out statutes for
parents
Seven states have no curriculum opt-out statute or
administration regulation allowing parents to exempt their
children from some part of the curriculum. These states are:
Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota,
and South Dakota. While the seven non-existent states do not
have specific opt-out statutes, it seems probable that most of
these states allow local school boards to adopt local policies
that permit parents to opt their children out of some curricular
units, particularly sex education.

2. States with restrictive or limited curriculum opt-out statutes
for parents
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia are classified
as restrictive states (see Table 2). Restrictive stHtes are those
states which have granted parents limited statutory rights to
exercise curriculum opt-out provisions in public schools. In this
study, for a state to be placed in the restrictive category,
statutory rights for curriculum opt-outs must be limited to one
or two courses or topics only. The restrictive states are
Alabama, Arkansas, District of Columbia, Idaho, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana,
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New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Vermont,
West Virginia, and Wyoming.
a. Opt-outs for sex education. When surveying the statutory
rights for opt-outs within restrictive states, several subgroups
were identified. The first and largest subgroup consists of ten
restrictive states that allow curriculum opt-outs for sex
education. The ten states are Alabama, District of Columbia,
Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana,
New Mexico, and Oklahoma. Three of these states in the first
subgroup, District of Columbia, Idaho, and Montana, allow only
sex education opt-outs. A statute or administrative regulation
in this subgroup might have been written without specific
procedures to obtain an opt-out, such as that found in
Louisiana's statute, which reads: "Any child may be excused
from receiving instruction in 'sex education' at the option and
discretion of his parent or guardian." 99
Idaho's statute, titled Excusing Children from Instruction
in Sex Education, provides very specific guidelines by stating:
Any parent or legal guardian who wishes to have his child
excused from any planned instruction in sex education may
do so upon filing a written request to the school district hoard
of trustees and the board of trustees shall make available the
appropriate forms for such request. Alternative educational
endeavors shall he provided for those excused. 100
A representative sex education opt-out statute, limited only
to sex education, is found in Massachusetts law, which requires
public schools to provide parents the opportunity to excuse
their child from sex education curriculum through written
notification directed to the school principal. The statute
stresses that "no child so exempted shall be penalized by
reason of such exemption." 101
On the other hand, one of the more distinctive sex
education opt-out provisions is found in a position statement
issued by the Montana Board of Public Education, which reads:
Any parent who believes their child is not developmentally
ready for the particular curriculum content information
adopted by the local district may ask to have their individual
child taken out of class when the information in question is

99. LA. HEV. STAT. ANN.§ 17:281(D) (2010).
100.

IDAHO Com: ANN.§ :J:l-1611 (2010).

101. MASS.

GE~. LAWS

ANN. ch. 71. § :l2a (WPst 2010).
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presented. This may be an alternative offered to parents by
local schools when human sexuality education or sensitive
topics are presented. This allows the parent of an individual
student the opportunity to say "Do not teach this to my child";
it does not give that parent the right to say "Do not teach this
to any child." 102

b. Opt-outs for sex education and AIDS instruction. Six
restrictive states-Alabama, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri,
Montana, and Oklahoma-form the second subgroup; each has
an opt-out statute for the combination of sex education and
AIDS instruction. For example, Alabama law allows "any child
whose parent presents to the school principal a signed
statement ... of such subjects that conflict with the religious
teachings of his church [to] be exempt from such
instruction." 103 A Missouri statute requires that the school
district notify each parent of "the basic content of the district's
or school's human sexuality instruction to be provided to each
student ... and the parent's right to remove the student from
any part." 104 The Missouri law also includes the instructional
requirement that districts provide the latest information about
STDs including HIV and AIDS. 105 Another example that covers
both sex education and HIV/AIDS instruction is found in
Oklahoma's statutes. Oklahoma law provides that, "[n]o
student shall be required to participate in AIDS prevention
education if a parent or guardian of the student objects in
writing to such participation," 106 and that, "[n]o student shall
be required to participate in a sex education class or program
which discusses sexual behavior or attitudes if a parent or
guardian of the student objects m writing to such
participation." 107
c. Opt-outs for HIV I AIDS instruction only. The third
subgroup is comprised of New York, 10 g West Virginia, 109 and

102. MONTANA OFFICE OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION, CURRICULUM GUIDELINES FOR
HIV/Al DS EDUCATION 2G (1999). available at http://opi.mt.gov/pdf/H lVED/Curric
l'lanGuide.pdf.
JO:l. AIA Com:§ 16-11-G (2010).
101. Mo. I{EV. STAT.§ 170.015.1 (2010).
105. /d.
106. OKLA. STAT. tit. 70. § 11-10:J.il(C) (2010).
107. /d.§ 11-105.1.
1 Oi:l. N.Y. COMM'H I{J<:(;. 1 il5.il(2)(i).
109. W.VA. COilE§ 18-2-9 (2011).
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Wyoming, 110 which possess statutes or regulations that only
allow limited opt-outs in HIV/AIDS instruction and do not
permit general sex education opt-outs. For example, New York
Commissioner of Education Regulation title 8, section
135.3(2)(i), states:
No pupil shall be required to receive instruction concerning
the methods of prevention of AIDS if the parent or legal
guardian of such pupil has filed with the principal of the
school which the pupil attends a written request that the
pupil not participate in such instruction, with an assurance
that the pupil will receive such instruction at home.

In a 1996 administrative appeal, the New York
Commissioner of Education made clear that New York
administration regulations only permit parents to exempt their
children from those parts of AIDS-related instruction
"concerning the methods of prevention of AIDS" and does not
allow a complete opt-out of AIDS-related instruction. 111 In
Appeal of Revered Freelon Kerry, Reverend Kerry sought an
exemption for his daughters from Watertown City School
District's entire AIDS curriculum and child sexual abuse
training. 112 Denied at the local level, Kerry appealed to the
New York State's Commissioner of Education. 113 The
Commissioner ruled against Kerry, concluding that Watertown
City School District had correctly exempted Kerry's children
from only the "methods of prevention" portion of the AIDS
curriculum, in compliance with the AIDS opt-out provision. 114
In addition, the Commissioner ruled that the district correctly
refused to exempt the children from either the remaining
portions of the AIDS curriculum or the child sexual abuse
program on the grounds that it lacked the authority to waive
these instructional requirements. 115 "The programs to which
petitioner objects are required by State regulations that

110. HIV/i\IDS Mom;L POLICY FOI{ WYOM!Nc; PUBLIC SCHOOLS (Sept. 1991-l)
[hereinafter H!V/i\!DS MODEL POLICY] (on file with authors).
111. Rev. Freel on W. Kerry, N.Y. Comm'r of Educ., Decision No. 1:l.fi62 (March H,
199()) (administrative appeal).
112. /d.
11:l. /d.
111.

/d.

115. /d.
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provide no exceptions other than the exemption outlined
above," the Commissioner ruled. 116
Within the third subgroup, the policies of West Virginia and
Wyoming, dealing with parental opt-outs of HIV/AIDS
curriculum and materials, are very similar in scope to New
York's regulation. The West Virginia regulation requires "an
opportunity shall be afforded to the parent or guardian of a
child subject to instruction in the prevention, transmission, and
spread of AIDS" to "exempt such child from participation." 117
Similarly, the Wyoming policy also allows parents, if they
submit a written request, to have their "child not receive
instruction in specific HIV prevention topics at school." 11 R
While the three states of New York, West Virginia, and
Wyoming permit HIV/AIDS curriculum opt-outs, parental
rights are very limited because the removal from instruction is
only specified in the area of AIDS prevention.
d. Opt-outs for AIDS and other diseases. Pennsylvania and
Vermont have a similar blend of curriculum opt-outs and form
the fourth subgroup. Pennsylvania allows opt-outs for
curriculum addressing AIDS and Vermont allows opt-outs for
communicable diseases, including AIDS. Pennsylvania Code
section 4.29(c) (an administrative regulation) designates, "A
school entity shall excuse a pupil from HIV/AIDS instruction
when the instruction conflicts with the religious beliefs or
principles of the pupil or parent or guardian of the pupil and
when excusal is requested in writing." Vermont allows a parent
to excuse their children from instruction about disease (defined
to include "HIV infection" and "other sexually transmitted
diseases") 119 when "the teaching of disease, its symptoms,
development and treatment, conflicts with the parent's
religious convictions." 120 The other curriculum opt-out allowed
by both Pennsylvania and Vermont is for animal dissection.
Animal dissection opt-out statutes, found in fourteen states
including Pennsylvania and Vermont, are discussed later in
this chapter.
e. Other restrictive states. Some restrictive states do not
have any consistent characteristics that assist grouping with
116. /d.
117. 50 W.Va. Bd. of Educ. Pol.§ 2122.15.
118. HIV/AIDS MODEL I'OLICY, supra note 100.
119. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 1G, § 1:11 (2010).
120. ld.
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other states. This final subgroup of restrictive states consists of
exclusive combinations of statutes. For example, Iowa is the
only restrictive state allowing opt-outs for the combination of
both physical education (P.E.) and health education, 121 while
P.E. is the only course students may be exempted from in
Arkansas. 122 Iowa's statute allows students to be exempt from
"either physical education or health courses" if the "course
conflicts with the pupil's religious belief." 123 Arkansas law
allows parents to remove their children from P.E. classes if it
"will violate the student's religious beliefs and would not be
merely a matter of personal objection." 124 In order for the optout to be viable, the parent or student "must be members of a
recognized religious faith that objects to physical education as
part of its official doctrine or creed." 125 The last variation of an
opt-out combination occurs in the State of Indiana with the
subjects of health education and hygiene. Under Indiana law,
hygiene and sanitary science instruction must "explain the
ways that dangerous communicable diseases are spread and
the sanitary methods for disease prevention and restriction." 126
A student may be excused if his parent "objects in writing, to
health and hygiene courses because the courses conflict with
the student's religious teachings." 127
The most common statutory right for parental opt-outs,
occurring in ten of the eighteen restrictive states, is for sex
education. To be classified as a restrictive state, parents are
allowed either one curriculum opt-out or a combination of two
curriculum opt-outs. Most of the restrictive states, fourteen of
the eighteen, allow curriculum opt-outs in two curricular areas.
Arkansas, District of Columbia, Idaho, and West Virginia are
the restrictive jurisdictions that statutorily permit an opt-out
in only one curriculum area.

121.
122.
12:l.
121.
12fi.
12().
127.

lOW.\ COllE§ 256.11 (2010).
Al{K. COllE AN.\1. § 6-16-1:)2 (2011).
IOWA COllE~ 256.11(()) (2010).
ARK. CODE ANN. § 6- Hi-1 :l2 (b)(1)(B)(ii)(a)(b).

!d.
INIJ. CODE§ 20-30-5-9 (a) (2011).

ld. § 20-:l0-5-9 (d).
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3. States with Permissive or Broad Curriculum Opt-Out
Statutes for Parents
The last classification of states is perm~sswe, which
constitutes a much broader stance of parental rights using
curriculum opt-outs in public schools. In this study, twenty-six
permissive states have granted parents broad statutory rights
to exercise curriculum opt-out provisions in public schools (see
Table 2). States labeled in the permissive category must have
statutory rights for curriculum opt-outs that meet one or both
of the following criteria: (1) more than two courses or topics are
allowed for opt-out, and/or (2) opt-ins required before students
can even enroll in a course. Permissive states are Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. As with restrictive
states, several subgroups can be identified after surveying the
statutory rights for opt-outs within permissive states.
a. Opt-outs for sex education. The first and largest subgroup
of permissive states consists of twenty-five states, all of which,
with the exception of Ohio, allow opt-out provisions for sex
education. Unlike many of the restrictive states, sex education
opt-outs are just one of several exemptions allowed by most
permissive states. One of the more intriguing statutes in this
subgroup is a California opt-out statute that acknowledges that
it is the parents' responsibility for "imparting values regarding
human sexuality to their children" as follows:
It is the intent of the Legislature to encourage pupils to
communicate with their parents or guardians about human
sexuality and supervise their children's education on these
subjects. The Legislature intends to create a streamlined
process to make it easier for parents and guardians to review
materials and evaluation tools related to comprehensive
sexual health education and HIV/AIDS prevention education,
and, if they wish, to excuse their children from participation
in all or part of that instruction or evaluation. The
Legislature recognizes that while parents and guardians
overwhelmingly support medically accurate, comprehensive
sex education, parents and guardians have the ultimate
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While California's code is unusual due to its parental focus,
Washington's opt-out statute addresses sex education opt-outs
without the parental focus and is representative of many
permissive states. Washington's statute is composed of four
common components: (1) "any parent who wishes to have his or
her child excused from instruction in sexual health education
may do so filing a written request"; (2) the request must be
filed "with school district board of directors or its designee, or
the principal of the school"; (3) "any parent may review the sex
education curriculum"; and (4) "students may not be penalized
as a result of being excused from sex education curriculum." 129
These four components are common to most permissive states.
b. Ohio. As previously mentioned, Ohio is the only state
that does not specifically allow opt-outs for sex education
curriculum. Ohio forms the second and smallest subgroup of
permissive states. While Ohio does not allow sex education optouts, the state requires public schools to grant opt-outs in three
curricular areas, not found in any other states: "instruction in
venereal disease education," "personal safety and assault
prevention" in kindergarten through sixth grade, and
"cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR)." 130 All Ohio curricular
exemptions require a "written request of the student's parent
or guardian." 131
c. Opt-outs for HIV I AIDS instruction. Two other large
subgroups deal with HIV/AIDS and health curricula. The third
permissive subgroup, consisting of twenty-two of the twenty-six
permissive states, allows opt-outs for HIV/AIDS instruction.
However, Colorado, Michigan, Mississippi, and South Carolina
do not specifically mention HIV/AIDS instruction in their
statutes. Florida's 2009 Statute is representative of the
majority of permissive states' statutes because it explicitly
mentions but encompasses more than HIV/AIDS instruction, as
follows:
Any student whose parent makes written request to the
school principal shall he exempted from the teaching of

128. CAL. EllUC. COllE§ fi19:17 (WPst 2010).
129. WASIL REV. COJm § 28A.:l00.175(6) (2011).
1:JO. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § :J:ll :l.60(5)(c)(d). (8)(WPst 2011 ).

1:n. Id.
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reproductive health or any disease, including HIV/AIDS, its
symptoms, development, and treatment. A student so
exempted may not be penalized by reason of that exemption.
Course descriptions for comprehensive health education shall
not interfere with the local determination of appropriate
curriculum which reflects local values and concerns. 132

d. Opt-outs for all health education. The fourth subgroup,
consisting of seventeen of the twenty-six permissive states,
provides opt-outs for health courses or comprehensive health
education. The states of Arizona, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin allow parents to remove their
children from any or all parts of health classes. A prototypical
statute for health curriculum opt-outs, similar to the sex
education statutes, is found in South Carolina's opt-out law:
A public school principal, upon receipt of a statement signed
by a student's parent or legal guardian stating that
participation by the student in the health education program
conflicts with the family's beliefs, shall exempt that student
from any portion or all of the units on reproductive health,
family life, and pregnancy prevention where any conflicts
occur. No student may be penalized as a result of an
exemption. School districts shall use procedures to ensure
that students exempted from the program by their parents or
guardians are not embarrassed by the exemption. 133

New Jersey's opt-out statute, more simplified and generic
than South Carolina's code, permits parents to excuse their
children from "any part of instruction in health, family life
education or sex education that is in conflict with his
conscience or sincerely held moral or religious beliefs." 134
e. Opt-ins. The seven permissive states of Colorado, 135
Maryland, Michigan, 136 Mississippi, 137 Nevada, I3R North
Carolina, 139 and Utah 140 form the fifth subgroup with st::1tutes
FIA STAT. § 100:l.12(:l) (2010).
§ 59-:32-50 (2010).
N .•J. STAT. ANN. § 1 HA::l5-1. 7 (West 2010).
COLO. i{EV. STAT. § 22-2:1- 101(6)(b) (2010).
MICH. ADMIN. COllEr. :lH0.1507(:l) (2010).
MISS. CODJ•:ANN. § :37-1:l-17:l (2010).
NEV. REV. STAT.§ :389.065 (2010).
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 115C-H(d)(7) (2010).
HO. UTAH ADMIN. IWLE r. 277-171-1 (2011).

1:l2.
1:3:3.
1:31.
1:35.
1:lG.
1:37.
1:li:l.
1:cl9.

S.C. CODE AN:-.1.
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that mandate curriculum opt-ins. An opt-in is different from an
opt-out and empowers parents dealing with a controversial
public school curriculum because it requires prior approval by
parents before their children may be enrolled in a specific
course. This mechanism reduces the possibility that their
children might come into contact with objectionable subject
matter. States requiring opt-ins are categorized as permissive
because opt-ins grant very deliberate and extensive parental
rights when dealing with curricula. In all eight of the opt-in
states, parents must give prior written consent for students to
participate in sex education courses. A public schools' receipt of
prior written approval by parents is a critical component of optins. For example, Utah's opt-in statute mandates that
"students may not participate in human sexuality instruction
or instructional programs . . . without pnor affirmative
parent/guardian response on file." 141
The advance opportunity for parents to receive ''an
overview of the topics and materials" 142 and even the "prior
opportunity to review materials used in the course" 143 are key
components of opt-ins. Colorado and Michigan statutes
exemplify opt-in guidelines. Colorado's statute states:
School officials shall receive prior written approval from a
parent or guardian before his or her child may participate in
any program discussing or teaching sexuality and human
reproduction. Parents must receive, with the written
permission slip, an overview of the topics and materials to be
presented in the curriculum. 144

Michigan provides for pupil opt-ins with an administrative
regulation which states:
A pupil shall not be enrolled in a class in which the subjects of
family planning or reproductive health are discussed unless
the pupil's parent or guardian is notified in advance of the
course and the content of the course, is given a prior
opportunity to review the materials to be used in the course,
and is notified in advance of his or her right to have the pupil

111. !d.
112. CoLO. RI•;V. STAT. § 22-25- 101(G)(b) (2010).
11il. MICH. ADMIN. Com; r. :J80.1507Ul) (2010).
111. COLO. RIW. STAT.§ 22-25-101 (6)(b).
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excused from the class. The state board shall determine the
form and content of the notice required in this subsection. 145

While six of the seven opt-in states, excluding Michigan,
only permit opt-ins or opt-outs for not more than two courses or
curricular topics, the criterion used for restrictive states, all
opt-in states are classified as permissive states. For this study's
purpose, any state that implements curriculum opt-ins
overrides the number of courses allowed for opt-outs due to the
empowerment effect for parents. This broad parental right to
control whether a child even enrolls in a certain course, or
opting in, warrants classification of an opt-in state as
permissive.
In 2009, a bill was introduced in the Tennessee legislature
that would "[require] local education agencies (LEAs) to obtain
written permission from parents or guardians for students to
take family life courses." 146 If this legislation is enacted,
Tennessee would become the eighth state to require parents to
opt in to instruction on sexual topics. Currently, Tennessee law
makes the teaching of sex education a Class C misdemeanor
unless the course is authorized by the State Board of Education
and the local school board and teacher is deemed qualified by
the local school board. 147
f Opt-outs for physical education. South Carolina and
Washington form the sixth subgroup of permissive states by
allowing opt-outs specifically for physical education. Both
states, while emphasizing the importance of being "physically
fit" in their statutes, still allow exemptions based on religious
objections. For example, South Carolina law provides:
The parent and student must show that the student's
attending physical education classes will violate their
religious beliefs and would not be merely a matter of personal
objection; and the parent or student must be members of a
recognized religious faith that objects to physical education as
part of its official doctrine or creed. 14 ~

The State of Washington addresses its P.E. opt-out by
providing flexibility to parents to allow their children to be
"excused ... on account of physical disability, employment, or

11fl.
116.
117.
118.

MICH. ADMIN. CODEr. :l80.1507(il).
H.R. 0218, 106th Gen. As;;em. Reg. Sess. (l'enn. 2009).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 19-6-1005 (2010).
S.C. Com; ANN. § i19-29-SO(B)(2)(a)-(b) (2010).
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religious belief, or because of participation in directed athletics
or military science and tactics or for other good cause." 149
g. Opt-outs for any class. Three permissive states, Arizona,
Minnesota, and Texas, form the last subgroup. These states are
the most permissive of all because they have the broadest
curriculum opt-out statutes for parents. These statutes grant
extensive statutory rights to parents, permitting opt-outs for
any class, school activity, and instructional materials in which
parents object. There are no specific courses or topics listed
such as sex education, comprehensive health education,
HIV/AIDS instruction, P.E., animal dissection as seen in all
other statutes. Arizona's opt-out law mandates school districts
to develop guidelines "by which parents who object to any
learning material or activity on the basis it is harmful may
withdraw their children from the activity or from the class or
program." 150 Minnesota's opt-out law is very similar because it
also ensures parental rights to review instructional materials,
and "if the parent, guardian, or adult student objects to the
content, to make reasonable arrangements with school
personnel for alternative instruction." 151
Texas may have the most permissive opt-out statute in the
U.S. Although federal case law does not generally support
parental rights in public education, Texas statutory law
provides significant support for parents. The Texas Education
Code sets forth the mission and objectives of Texas public
schools. The very first objective listed in this section of the
statute declares, "Parents will be full partners with educators
in the education of their children." 152 Texas Education Code
Chapter 26 is another entire chapter dedicated solely to
"Parent Rights and Responsibilities." In Chapter 26 of the
Texas Education Code, parents' rights are discussed and
include procedures to appeal denied complaints, access to
student records, access to teaching materials, requests for
public information, student directory information, and
exemption from instruction. Section 26.010 of the Texas
Education Code is the curriculum opt-out provision for Texas.
It allows parents to deliver a written request to the teacher of

119.
150.
151.
152.

WASH. REV. COllE§ 28A.2:J0.050 (2010).
i\iUZ. HEV. STAT. i\.:-.JN. § 15-10-2.:3 (2010).
MIN:-.1. STAT.§ 120B.20 (2010).
Tt•:x. EIJUC. Com; ANN.§ 1.001 (West 2010).
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the child to remove them from objectionable instruction. This
broad opt-out provision asserts:
(a) A parent is entitled to remove the parent's child
temporarily from a class or other school activity that conflicts
with the parent's religious or moral beliefs if the parent
presents or delivers to the teacher of the parent's child a
written statement authorizing the removal of the child from
the class or other school activity. A parent is not entitled to
remove the parent's child from a class or other school activity
to avoid a test or to prevent the child from taking a subject for
an entire semester. (b) This section does not exempt a child
from satisfying grade level or graduation requirements in a
manner acceptable to the school district and the agency. 153

The Texas statute recognizes both religious and moral
beliefs as grounds for exempting students from instruction.
While section 26.010 grants broad permissive rights to parents,
in regards to unlimited curricular courses or topics, it also
limits parents from exempting their child to "avoid a test,"
"taking a subject for an entire semester," and "satisfying grade
level or graduation requirements." 154
4. Animal dissection opt-outs
Animal dissection opt-outs are currently provided by
statute by fourteen states. California, Florida, Illinois, New
Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Virginia give statutory rights for animal
dissection opt-outs. Four other states, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, and New Mexico, have department of education
policies that allow students to object to dissection and request
an alternative assignment. These opt-outs usually require prior
notification from the school to parents if animal dissection is
part of its curriculum, including procedures on choosing
alternatives without penalty.
Representative of animal dissection opt-out statutes 1s
Oregon's dissection opt-out law which states:
(1) A K-12 public school student may refuse to dissect any
vertebrate or invertebrate animal or the parent or legal
guardian of a K-12 public school student may refuse to allow
the student to dissect any vertebrate or invertebrate animal.

1fi:l. /d.~ 26.010.
151. /d.
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(2) A school district that includes dissection as part of its
coursework shall permit students to demonstrate competency
in the coursework through alternative materials or methods
of learning that do not include the dissection of animals.
These alternative materials and methods may include but are
not limited to:
(a) Videotapes, DVDs and CD-ROMs;
(b) Models;

(c) Films;

(d) Books;
(e) Computer programs;
(f) Clay modeling; and

(g) Transparencies. 155

New Mexico's dissection opt-out policy (set forth in an
administrative regulation rather than a statute) is similar to
Oregon's dissection opt-out law. The New Mexico dissection
opt-out policy mentions "alternative techniques" to dissections
such as "using computer two-dimensional or three-dimensional
simulations, videotape or videodisk simulations, take-apart
anatomical models, photographs, or anatomical atlases." 156
Alternative to animal dissections are increasing. In March
2010, was introduced in the Connecticut legislature that would
"prohibit a school district from requiring any student who
raises a conscientious objection to dissection." 157
State laws allowing families to opt out of classroom
activities involving animal dissection are not directly related to
opt out laws that allow parents to shield their children from
instruction on religious topics. Nevertheless, the fact that
fourteen states allow families to withdraw their children from
instruction on animal dissection demonstrates that state
legislatures are willing to accommodate families that have
reasonable objections to certain topics in the school curriculum.

155. OR. REV. STAT. S :l:l7.:300 (2010).
15fi. N .M. Com; R. § G.29.1.11 (B)(S) (LcxisNcxis 201 0).
157. 11.1{ 522:l. G(:n. Asscm .. i{cg. Scss. (Conn. 2010).
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5. Summary of state curriculum opt-out statutes and
regulations
As discussed above, many states provide statutory rights
allowing parents to opt-out of all or part of courses such as sex
education and family life education. As shown in Figure 1, the
most common curriculum opt-out is for sex education, allowed
by thirty-five states. Eight states are even more parent-friendly
by prohibiting public schools from teaching sex education to
children unless the parents affirmatively give their permission.
An opt-in statutory or regulatory provision requires prior
approval by parents before their children may be enrolled in a
specific course, reducing the likelihood that the parents'
children might be taught objectionable subject matter. As
Figure 1 exhibits, thirty-three states have statutes that allow
opt-outs from HIV/AIDS instruction making it the second
largest curricular category. Twenty-seven states, some
restrictive and mostly permissive, allow opt-outs in their
statutes for both sex education and HIV/AIDS curricula. The
smallest curricular category for opt-outs is physical education,
allowed in seven states; and it seems probable that legislatures
in at least some of these seven states associated physical
education with sexuality-perhaps believing that physical
education classes is where sex education is most often taught.

Figure 1. State opt-out levels by subject area.

State Opt-Outs Levels
40

35
30

25
Number of
States

20

15
10

5
0
Sex Ed

Health

HIV/AIDS

P.E.

Category of Curriculum Opt-Outs

D1ssect1on

460

B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL

[2011

A few states, such as New York and Ohio, provide some
distinctive opt-out statutes or regulations. For instance, in New
York, a parent may only opt-out of instruction that covers the
prevention of AIDS. In Ohio, there are statutory rights given to
parents for opt-outs from courses not seen in other states such
as CPR, and personal safety and assault prevention. The
procedural process is uniform with thirty-one states specifically
requiring a written parent note in their opt-out statutes.
Eighteen states give authority to the local education agency to
develop the procedure for curriculum opt-outs. Specific
statutory and regulatory provisions are set forth in the
appendix.
Texas may have the most permissive curriculum opt-out
law in the U.S. 15 ~ Since the adoption of the statute in 1995,
there has been no published litigation over opt-outs in Texas.
Apparently, the state's curriculum opt-out law has created no
legal problems for Texas public schools in spite of its
permissiveness. In fact, having such a permissive law may help
Texas school administrators defuse tensions when they are
confronted by parents objecting to some curricular element,
whether sex education, evolution, HIV/AIDS instruction,
animal dissection, the celebration of Halloween, etc. The Texas
curriculum opt-out law recognizes that parents are a critical
part of the educational process and that it is important to
value, within limits, their input into curricular decisions in
public schools. The Texas curriculum opt-out statute and all of
the other states' opt-out statutes are practical and sensible
ways to help both parents and school administrators.
IV. SEX EDUCATION LAWS AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A number of states include fairly specific directions to
school districts about the manner in which sex education must
be taught. ln particular, several states direct that sex
education should emphasize abstinence from sex prior to
marriage and that sexual relations should only occur inside of
marriage. 159 In Florida, for example, school districts are

151:1. 'J'I<:X. EllUC. CO!Jp; ANN. § 2G.010 (West 2011).
159. See. e.g. IND. COilE § 20<!0-5-1:!(:1) (2011) (sex education should include
"instr·uction that the best way to avoid sexually transmitted diseases and other
associated health probh,ms is to establish a mutually faithful monogamous relationship
in the contl,Xt of marriage").
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required to "[t]each abstinence from sexuality outside of
marriage as the expected standard for all school-age students"
and to emphasize the benefits of "monogamous heterosexual
marriage." 160 In other states, sex-education laws do not define
marriage to preclude same-sex marriage, but it seems likely
that state legislatures intend that references to marriage in sex
education statutes mean heterosexual marriage.
In a few states, sex education statutes specifically bar any
positive presentation of homosexuality. Arizona, for example
prohibits school districts from engaging in any instruction that
"[p]romotes a homosexual lifestyle," "[p]ortrays homosexuality
as a positive alternative life-style," or "[s]uggests that some
methods of sex are safe methods of homosexual sex." 161 Arizona
law also prohibits sex-education instruction from including any
teaching about "abnormal, deviate or unusual sexual acts or
practices." 162 In Arizona, sex education is required to "promote
honor and respect for monogamous heterosexual marriage." 163
Louisiana law specifies that "[n]o sex education course offered
in the public schools of the state shall utilize any sexually
explicit materials depicting male or female homosexual
activity." 164 In South Carolina, instruction in health education
"may not include a discussion of alternate sexual lifestyles from
heterosexual relationships including, but not limited to,
homosexual relationships except in the context of instruction
concerning sexually transmitted diseases." 165 In Utah, healtheducation materials may not advocate homosexuality 166 or
sexual activity outside marriage. 167 And in Alabama, school
districts' sex education programs are required by law to
emphasize "that homosexuality is not a lifestyle acceptable to
the general public and that homosexual conduct is a criminal
offense under the laws of most states." 16 R

160.
161.
162.
16il.
161.
165.
166.
1G7.
1G8.

FLA. STAT. § 100il.16(2)(a) (2010) (l,mphasis added).
All!Z. I{EV. STAT. ANN.§ 15-716(C)(1)-(:l) (2011).
Aim. ADMIN. CODE§ R7-2-:J0il(A)(il)(a) (2009).
!d. § 1{7 -2-:lO:l(A)(il)(h)(v).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 17:2t-11A(il) (2010).
S.C. CoDE ANN.§ 59-:l2-ilO(A)(5)(2010).
UTAH Com; ANN.§ 5:lA-12-101(l)(b)(iii) (A)(Il) (West 2010).
!d.§ 5:lA-12-101(1)(b)(iii)(A)(IV).
ALA. Com;§ 1G-10A-2(c)(8) (201 0).
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A MODEL STATUTE TO PERMIT PARENTS TO EXEMPT THEIR
CHILDREN FROM INSTRUCTION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION

As Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer, Inc. 169 and Parker v.
Hurley 170 illustrate, parents may not be able to effectively
shield their children from objectionable instruction or
curricular activities even if they live in a state that has a
curriculum opt-out statute. Both cases took place in
Massachusetts, which has a parent opt-out law allowing
parents to shield their children from instruction on sexual
topics in the public schools. Yet in both cases, parents whose
children were exposed to sexual topics that were objectionable
to them found they had no legal remedy in a federal court. To
provide parents with better legal protection from having their
children exposed to objectionable instruction on sexual topics,
an opt-in law-requiring schools to get parents' affirmative
written permission before offering any instruction or curricular
materials on sexual topics-is preferable.
The following proposed statute, modeled after the Colorado
sex-education opt-in law, 171 is offered as a model:
(l)School officials shall receive prior written approval from a
parent or guardian before his or her child may participate in
or be exposed to any program, instructional activity, or
instructional material that discusses human sexuality,
human reproduction, sexual orientation, AIDS/HIV, or
sexually transmitted diseases, or non-heterosexual marriage.
School officials must provide parents or guardians with a
written overview of all instruction and materials that will be
presented to students that pertain to the subjects listed in
this subsection at least one week in advance of presenting the
instruction or materials to students.
(2)If school authorities do not receive written permission from
a parent or guardian allowing the parent's child to participate
in a program or instructional activity described in subsection
(1), the child must be excused from attendance without any
academic penalty.
(3)The state board of education shall determine the form and
content of the notice required in this section ..

]()9. 68 F.:ld 52;1 (1st Cir. 1995).
170. 511 F.:ld 87 (1st Cir. 2008).
171. COLO. ){JW. STAT. § 22-25-1 04(6)(b) (2010).
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(4)Willful violation of this section by any public school
employee or school board member constitutes a Class C
misdemeanor.
(5)A parent who prevails in litigation to enforce the rights set
forth in this section shall receive reasonable attorney fees.

Families who are opposed to same-sex marriage on religious
grounds need strong statutory protection to ensure that their
children are not exposed to notions of sexuality and marriage
that are offensive to their religious beliefs-especially in states
that have recognized same-sex marriage as a legal right. Of
course, no statute designed to give families the legal right to
shield their children from objectionable sexual topics in the
school curriculum will be effective if courts refuse to enforce it.
As we saw in Brown and Parker, the First Circuit gave families
no relief when they sought a remedy to having their children
exposed to sexual topics they found objectionable on religious
grounds even though the state in which they residedMassachusetts-had a curriculum opt-out law on the books.
This proposed model statute cannot force a court to enforce
the rights protected in the statute, but it does contain elements
that will strengthen parents' position. First, the statute is an
opt-in statute rather than an opt-out statute, which forces
school officials to get written permission from parents before
exposing children to programs, instructional materials,
instructional activity that addresses sexuality. Thus, the onus
is on school officials to get parents' permission before exposing
children to sexual themes. The assumption behind the statute
is that parents object to exposing their children to sexual topics
in school unless they indicate in writing that they do not object.
Second, the statute contains a criminal penalty, which
makes it a misdemeanor for school employees or school-board
members to willfully violate the law and awards parents
reasonable attorney fees that they incur if they are forced to go
to court to assert their rights under the law. By making a
statutory violation a state-law criminal offense, parents are
more likely to go to state courts rather than federal courts to
enforce their statutory rights, where judges may be more
sympathetic to parents' legal entitlements than the federal
courts have shown themselves to be.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Federal case law makes it clear: parents have no
constitutional right to excuse their children from any part of
public school curricula, even if the parents' objection is based
on religious or moral grounds. As the First Circuit stated in
Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 172 parents do
not have the constitutional right to "dictate the curriculum at
the public school." 173 In Parker v. Hurley, 174 parents believed
the public school was indoctrinating their children about
homosexuality in contradiction to their religious beliefs; yet the
First Circuit Court of Appeals exclaimed that "public schools
are not obliged to shield individual students from ideas which
potentially are religiously offensive." 175
In those states that now recognize same-sex marriage, it
seems probable that the curricula will begin portraying samesex marriage in ways that are objectionable to many American
families on religious grounds. 176 Nevertheless, given the
willingness of most states to allow parents to shield their
children from sex education, legislatures in the same-sex
marriage states may be willing to adopt opt-out statutes that
allow parents to shield their children from instruction that
positively portrays same-sex marriage. In fact, in some states,
current opt-out statutes for sex education may already be
adequate to allow opt-outs for sexual orientation curriculum,
a1though as Parker demonstrated, a Massachusetts sexeducation opt-out law did not protect parents who wished to
shield their elementary-school children from exposure to
reading materials that portrayed same-sex marriage in a
positive light.
This model statute is not presented as an expression of
hostility or opposition to same-sex marriage; indeed the
authors acknowledge that same-sex marriage has been
recognized by the courts in some states as a constitutional right
guaranteed by their states' constitutions. Nevertheless,

172. 68 F.:ld 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
17:l. /d. at G:J:l.
171. 5H F.:id H7 (1st Cir. 200H).
17G. /d. at 106.
176. Jill Tucker, Uproar Oucr Lessons About Gays, Lesbians, S. F. CHHON., May
29. 2009. at AI (reporting on parents' objedion to Calif(n·nia school district's portrayal
of samc·scx marriage in positive light in curriculum unit about diversity).
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families who are opposed to same-sex marriage on religious
ground deserve the right to protect their children from
portrayals of sexuality and marriage that offend their religious
values. The federal courts have consistently declared that
parents have no right under the federal constitution to shield
their children from instruction that offends their religious
beliefs. Therefore, statutory protection as outlined in the model
statute is the only way to give parents reasonable protection
from having their children exposed to instruction in the public
schools that undermines or disregards their religious values.
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APPENDIX
State Curriculum Opt-Out Statutes or Regulations
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Rcgulatinns

lnfi.mnation

c;

()

g
()

Alabama

Alaska
Arizona

Restrictive

P/N

X

"conflicts w/
religious teaching
of church"

ALA. COlli

"object to any

ARIZ. Rt·.\.

learning material

STAT. ANI\.

Non-existent
Permissive

None
X

X

X

P/N

or activity on
basis it is harmful
may \Vithdraw
their children.
because it
questions beliefs
or practices in
sex, morality, or
rcli!!ion"
Arkansas

Restrictive

~ 16-41-6

1'/N

X

'

I S-1 02

ARI/. All~1!--;.

( 'ont
~ R7-2-:Hl3 (sex
education)

"parent must

ARK. Colli

show I'. E. will
violate student's
religious hcliciS"
and "must be
members of
rccogni;cd

AI\N.
~ (J-\

(>-.\2

religious lltith"

('alifornia

Colorado

Connl•cticut

Pt:rmissivc

Pcnnis~ive

Pennissivc

Delaware

Non-e.\.istcnt

()istrict of
Columbia

Rcstrictiv'c

P/N

X

X

X

X

1'/N

P/N

Opt-out any or all;
"parents have
ultimate
rcsronsihilily j()r
imparting values
regarding
sexw11ity to their
children"
Opt-in ll)r sexed"'school onicials
shall receive prior
written arrroval;"
Opt-out for health
""written note shall
he sufficient to
exempt student
from program in
its entirety or
form portion"

CAl. ;\[)Mil\.

No spccitic n:ason
required

D.C. M""
RHiS. til.),
chapter 23

Colli
~

s 1240
s \9)7

~

J22))

~

CoLo.

Rtv.

SiAl.
~

22-2S-104

~ 22-IS-101>
CONN. (iF!\.

STAT.

~ \0-16c
\0-\9

''

None
X

1'/N

nos
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Florida

Pennissivc

X

P/N

No specillc reason

I·JA. STAT. ~

required

I 003.42
('"n:product ivc
health" &
IIIV\J\IDSl
q lll03.47(1)(a)
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(animal
dissection)
Gcoq~ia

Pcnnissivc

llawaii

Non-existent

Idaho

Restrictive

Illinois

X

P/N

'Tach local board
shall"

(i,\. ('Oilf J\i"N.
~20-2-143

None

X

Permissive

X

P/N

P/N

illAIIOCOill·

"J<nnily life and
sex education ..

;\]'\:\1.

rests upon home

~

and church";
schools

1611(2010)

supplement
No specific
required

rc<-L~on

33-

I 05 ILL. COM!'.
SlAT. 110!3
(2010)
(pertaining to
AIDS & family

life instruction),
112/1 s
(dissection of
animal'\)

23 ILL. J\IJ\11~.
CoDL tit. 23, ~
1.420(p)(6)(201
0) (physical
education)

Indiana

Restrictive

P/N

X

May also opt-out
of hygiene

!Nil. CoD/
~

20-30-5 %1)

Instruction

Iowa

Restrict ivc

X

P/N

"not required to
enroll in P.E. or

IOWA ('Oil/
~

256.11.11

health if course
conflicts with
Kansas

Restrictive

Kentucky

Non-existent

Louisiana

Restrictive

Permissive

X

X

X

religious belief'
"l:ach board of
education
shall . .include
rroccdures
whereby pupil
shall be excused
from any or all
portions"
Kcnlucky Dept or
Ld believes many
districts provide
local opt-outs
"any child
excused at option
and discretion of
parent ... local or
parish school
board shoJI
provide
procedures;" no
specific reason
reyuircd
No speci fie reason
rcyuin:d

KAN. ;\D!\·11:--.J.
RI'CiS.
~ 91-3!20(b)(2i(D)

None

LA. RLV. STAI.
Al\"\1.
~

17:2XI(D)

MJ:. Ri V. SJXI.

tit. 22, ~ 191 L
tit. 7, ~ ]971
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Maryland

Permissive

X

Opt-In required
for sex education;

Mil. COlli

no spccitic reason

J:li\.04.1 X 03
111\.04. I X 04

required

\1assachusctts

X

Restrictive

1'/N

[2011

""[l'[olicy shall
afford parent~
llexibility to
exempt their child
from sex
education.

Rl <iS.

MAss. (ill\.

LAWSch.7L
~

321\; !>i,tricl
am/.\(·hool
/\Jhcies and
R.c.wurces for
/)isseclion oflli
n;,.,.ection
Altcrnatires ;,1
,)'cicnce

provided by

Ma". llcpt. ol·
l~duc.

Michigan

Pcnni~sivc

X

X

1'/N

··conllict vv lth

Mil II. i\I>Mit-'.

sincerely held
religious beliefS''

CollJ.rr.

for health opt-out:
Opt-in required

Minnesota

1\1 ississippi

X

Permissive

X

Permissive

PIN

for sex education
"I lave
procedure .
i I'
parent object~ to
the contenl. to
make reasonable
arrangements with
school personnel
for alternative
instructi(m"
Opt-in for sex
education required

3XO 1170,
3XO.I506.
3XO.I 507.
3XO.I507a
MI'\N. ST-\T.

1201!.20

MIS~. COD!

i\l'N.
~17-11-17.1

Mis.osouri

Re~trictive

X

Sex Fducatinn &
IIIV/i\lllS only

Mo. Rl v. s·1A1

Restrictive

X

"Any parcnh who
believes the1r
child 1s not

MONIANA

~1700151())

Oi Fi<T 01·
PI"BII('

developmentally

\NSTKll('r!Ol'<.

ready i()r
particular
curricular content
may ask to take
child out of class"

(JliiDIJ.INI S !'OR

IIIV 1 i\IIJS

Lilt:< AllOt<,
http:/iopi.mt.go
v'pdCIIIVI.I)IC
urrir.: Plan(j UJdl'.

pdf
.'<cbraska

Non-existent

.'icvada

Pcrmissi\c

~llampshirc

None

X

Permissivl'

PiN

X

Opt-in I(Jr sex
education &
AIDS
Sex education.

Health,
Nl'W

Jersey

Pcrmi~sivc

X

X

X

IIIV/i\IDS
Opt-out from sex
education l(n
"'sincerely held

bclicb"

NIV.RI\'

ST\1'.
~

1X9.065
N.ll. RIV.

STAT /\1\\:.
~IX611(1X)(b)

N.J. SlAT. ;\'\t<.
~ I Xi\:.1)-4.7.
~ I Xi\ 35-4.25
2.c
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J\ew Mexico

Restrictrvc

X

X

'"Each :-.chool
district shall

N.M.CoDIR.
6.29.6.11 (X)

~

imrlement rohcy
that insure parents
have ability to

exempt their
child"

-.cw York

North l 'arolina

North Dakota

Rcstnctivc

X

X

Permissive

X

P/N

Non-existent

Opt-out m

"'method:, of
prevent ion 0 r
AIDS" & animal
dissection
Opt-in ftx sex
cducatron &
AIDS
North Dakota
Dept o!Td
believe~ local

N.Y. C'm1M'R
Ri <• l.l5.3(2)(i)
N.Y. LlliiC
LAW 9 X09

N.C Citt-:.
STAT.
~ 115( '_
XI (d)(7)(201 0)
None

control allovvs
opt-outs in :-,ex-

related curriculum

Ohio

X

Permissrvc

PiN

Opt-outs
permitted in
venereal disea.-.c
education:
personal safety

and as:-.ault

Oiil<l Rl\.
C'OiliA"'I\.
ss
1111.60(;\ )(5 )(
c), (d)
q B!HO(A)(X)

prcvcntron in

grades K-6: and
Oklahoma

Restrictive

X

P/N

Ore~ on

Permissive

X

PiN

CI'R
Sex education &
AIDS prevention
"no pupil shall be
required to take or
participate in any
in~truction

OKI A. STAt.
~ 70-1 I -I 03.3
~ 70-11-105.1
OiC Rl v. SlAT
~ .136.465
~ 3.17.300

in sex

education, .
after parent has

reviewed
materials"
J,cnns} lvania

R.c~trictivc

X

X

PiN

HIYiAIIJS
instruct ion &
animal dis~cction

22 PA.

Colli·~

4.2Y
(AIIJS 1111V)
24 I' A. Col\s.
StAr.~ 151523 (2010)

(dissection of
animals)

Rhode Island

Permissive

X

PiN

"Exempt ions"
given for sex
education, health,

AIDS instruction,
& animal
South Carolina

Pcnn1~~ivc

X

X

X

P/N

dissection
Opt-out of health
education f()r

"conflicts with

South l)akota

Non-existent

liunily's belie!\"
& opt-out of P.L.
ir"violatcs
religious he lief'>"
South Dakota
Dept. of Ed
hcl icvc~ loca I l)pt-

outs arc provided

R.I. till\. LA\\S
~ 16-22-17
~ 16-22-IX
~ I (J-22-20

S.C. Colli' ANI\.
~ 59-32-50
~ 59-32-XO

None
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'l'cnncssec

X

Permissive

P/N

Opt-in f(>r liunily
life courses

l2011

l'lt-:N.Com
ANt-i.
~ 4~-6-LlO.l

(being amended

Broad opt-out
Texas

l)crmissivc

Utah

Pcnnissi\-C

X

X

P/N

X

P/N

provision but
"parent is not
entitled to remove
child to avoid a
test or prevent
child from taking
subject f{Jr entire
semester "
Opt-In rcqll!rcd
I{Jr sex education

by Tennessee
!Ill OXI2 & Sll
1214)
Trx.l:iJt't.
COIJI' ANN.
~ 26.010

LITAII

AIJMI~.

COD!'

r. 277-474-1

Vermont

Rc~tnctivc

Virginia

Pcrmis~ive

X

X

P/N

Opt-outs for sex
education &
animal dissection

VT SI\L ;\~'..
tit Ill,
~~ 134, ~12

X

P/N

Opt-outs fiJr

VA. Colli A'<t>:.
~ 22.1-207.1
~ 22.1-2011.(11

htmily lire
education &
animal dissection
\Vashington

Pennissivc

X

X

PiN

Opt-out:-. ll)r sex

WA\II.Rl'\'

education,

Com

lilY/AIDS

~

instruction, &
P.l:.: "rc\igiou~

~
~

2XA 2JII.(I)O
2XA.2311.070
2XA ..1011.47_)

bclicf"must he
used I(Jr P.!·..
West Virginia

Rc~trictivc

X

P/N

\\'isconsin

Penmssivc

X

PIN

\Vyoming

Rc~trictivc

X

PIN

Opt-out ll1r AIDS
only

W.VA.

Opt-outs in
human growth
and development
sex education,

WIS. SIAl
IIX.OI'!(4)

COD!.~

IX-2-~

q

health, AIIJS
Opt-out ilJr illY
prevention only

lilY/AIDS
Molltl (>()[

!( 'l

H>R \VYOM!!\(i
Pt:BI I<

S< !!oo! s

